Amend
Conflicts take an enormous toll on civilians, beyond what is typically captured by death tolls or other statistics alone. Large-scale or entrenched violence can leave victims, communities, and whole societies with deep scars. These include physical wounds that continue to define survivors’ lives even after the guns fall silent, often exacerbated by the increasing use of explosive weapons on modern, urban battlefields. Mental scars, however, can be just as impactful: living with the trauma of witnessing violations, grief following the deaths of loved ones, or the deep frustration and hurt of seeing such crimes go unpunished. States often make uncomfortable compromises between peace and justice in the aftermath of wars, leaving some harm unaddressed. These reverberating effects of conflicts can undermine social cohesion, while fueling tensions that could erupt in renewed violence if not properly addressed.
It is therefore crucial that governments, combatants, and international support actors prioritize the rights of victims both during and after armed conflicts. This includes providing reparations and accountability when violations have occurred, as set out in both international human rights and humanitarian law, and in subsequent standards such as the UN’s Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations (see below).1 It also encompasses the concept of amends, which is distinct from reparations under international law. Amends is the practice of recognizing harm done, and/or providing some material or financial post-harm assistance to civilians who have been hurt in war due to the presence, activities, and operations of armed actors, even when no violation has been identified. While not a legal obligation, amends—whether through formal apologies, monetary compensation, or material assistance—can provide some much-needed aid or closure for victims, although they should not serve as a replacement for more comprehensive forms of justice.
Cycles of Unaddressed Harm in Afghanistan
This article was authored by Mukhtar Hussaini, a South Asia Conflict Analyst
Afghan civilians have suffered repeated harms over decades. While the actors and authorities have changed, the brutal reality of civilians’ daily lives has not. Without adequate redress, these harms have festered and compounded.
The 2009 US troop surge, followed by intensified joint operations by US and Afghan forces against the Taliban and lasting until the fall of Kabul to Taliban forces in August 2021, subjected civilians to continuous cycles of harm. They were often caught between insurgent attacks and international military operations. In March 2012, for example, a US soldier massacred 16 civilians in Kandahar’s Panjwai district, including women and nine children, some of whose bodies were burned.2 In October 2015, a US gunship destroyed a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) trauma hospital in Kunduz, killing 42 patients and medical staff.3 US and NATO forces supporting a National Directorate of Security (NDS) raid in Nangarhar’s Bati Kot district in May 2017 killed at least two children and their mother, injuring other family members.4 More broadly, night raids in Wardak and Logar involving Afghan and US special forces were often marked by arbitrary killings, enforced disappearances, and property destruction. A 2019 improvised explosive device (IED) attack in Farah killed 34 civilians.5
Despite extensive casualty tracking by UNAMA and documentation of these and other harms by civil society groups, survivors have rarely received acknowledgment, amends, or rights-based redress. Although the Afghan government put in place a Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Prevention Policy in 2017, corruption and bureaucratic hurdles undermined its implementation, and the Afghan National Army consistently failed to document or address civilian harm.6 For their part, international actors framed such harm as an inevitable consequence of war and relied on ad hoc, opaque payments rather than rights-based remedies. The failure of international and Afghan forces to transparently address most incidents of harm through investigations, recognition, apologies, or compensation was a systemic failure in the protection of civilians that eroded public trust and laid the foundations for the crisis in civilian resilience that Afghans are experiencing today.7
When the Taliban took power in August 2021, they ushered in a new era of harm and impunity. Interviews with survivors from Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar, and Bamyan indicate that abuse is embedded in daily life.8 Patterns of harm in 2024 included nighttime home searches without warrants or explanation that left property damaged and families fearful; arbitrary detention on trivial or fabricated pretexts, such as refusing to surrender personal belongings or alleged contact with international organizations; targeted threats and harassment based on past government service, ethnic or religious identity, or perceived dissent; and the effective erasure of public space, which turns civic participation into an act of calculated risk. A former women’s literacy coordinator who CIVIC interviewed, for instance, reported repeated late-night visits by security agents and written orders to cease her activities, after which she felt obliged to remain indoors and restrict visitors to her household.9 CIVIC also interviewed a youth organizer who described having to cancel community meetings following phone checks and intimidating calls from local Taliban officials.10 He noted that being visible was enough to bring trouble. A former district official recounted the detention of his teenage son for refusing to hand over a family phone, followed by a house search and ongoing surveillance that forced the family to relocate.11 Other civil society respondents reported phone inspections at checkpoints, confiscation of devices, and routine warnings against attending gatherings, leading to widespread self-censorship and the closure of informal study circles.12
Independent monitoring in 2024 corroborated these accounts. Human Rights Watch reported persistent arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings, disproportionately affecting women, journalists, former civil servants, and minority communities.13 Amnesty International characterized the de facto authorities’ policies as gender persecution amounting to “gender apartheid,” systematically excluding women and girls from education, employment, and public life, and called for recognition of this conduct as a crime under international law.14 In their reporting from 2024, both organizations describe severe restrictions on civil society, independent media, and humanitarian access not as temporary security measures but as deliberate instruments to consolidate power and suppress dissent.
The overarching picture of 2024 from CIVIC’s interviews and human rights reporting is one of systematic abuses in Afghanistan: organized, targeted, and policy driven. In Afghanistan today, repression is not a by-product of political transition; it is the governing method. The result is a public sphere in which visibility is vulnerability, especially for women, and lawful avenues for redress are deliberately closed. Legacies of earlier violations have collided with new abuses, intensifying and perpetuating civilian vulnerability. Survivors live with unresolved trauma from past losses, including the killing of relatives, the destruction of their homes, and forced displacement, while facing renewed violations. This unresolved trauma makes it more difficult to absorb new challenges and deprivations. Exposure repeats, recovery stalls, and community risk worsens over time.
Years of disrupted livelihoods, the loss or disappearance of breadwinners, repeated displacement, and the erosion of community support systems have stripped households of economic buffers and social cohesion. When new abuses occur, coping mechanisms are exhausted and access to assistance is constrained, leading to secondary harms like hunger, debt, and negative coping strategies. As one displaced civilian in Nangarhar explained, “When my husband was detained, we lost our only source of income. I borrowed money to buy food, but now the debt is impossible to repay. No one has ever recognized what happened to us, and without help, we cannot recover.”15 Without acknowledgment, practical assistance, and community-level amends, risk compounds and preventable setbacks harden into self-reinforcing insecurity.
The ripple effects of reverberating harms have extended across borders. Large-scale deportations of Afghan refugees from Iran began in late 2024 and intensified in early 2025.16 These deportations returned displaced families to high-risk provinces such as Nangarhar, Helmand, and Uruzgan. In one documented case, a former teacher from Helmand who had lived in Iran for eight years after surviving a Taliban attack was deported with his family in December 2024 and sent back to the same district where threats to him persisted, without access to shelter, livelihoods, or protection.17 Forced returns without protection screening, referrals, or basic safeguards were layered on top of the original harms that prompted Afghans to flee the country.
A priority moving forward is to implement survivor-centered amends and redress that are realistic under current constraints. (1) Afghan duty-bearers and relevant international actors should make time-bound, measurable commitments to acknowledge credible incidents of harm, conduct transparent investigations that safeguard survivors and witnesses from retaliation, and commit to measures for non-recurrence; (2) The Taliban, as the de facto authorities in Afghanistan, should be pressed to adopt at least basic survivor-centered amends practices, including clear acknowledgment language, safe notification, minimal and secure documentation, and community-level acknowledgment. While a full SOP is unlikely under current conditions, international and exiled Afghan actors can help model and sustain these standards where the authorities fail; (3) International actors should enable safe and remote survivor participation in justice, monitoring, and civilian protection advocacy mechanisms, through collaboration with exiled Afghan human rights defenders and civil activists, who can be supported to issue periodic briefs on the state of civilian harm and amends in Afghanistan. Given current conditions in Afghanistan, such mechanisms are both feasible and appropriate.
Addressing Crimes of the Past: International Justice Efforts for Conflict Victims
Justice for conflict violations can provide victims with a sense of dignity and closure, help establish a wider culture of the rule of law, and break cycles of violence by ensuring that the same crimes cannot simply be repeated with impunity. Justice goes beyond merely holding perpetrators to account. It also includes providing reparations for victims and ensuring society keeps their memory alive, for example, through memorials, national days, or other commemorations. In the wake of mass atrocities or large-scale conflicts, transitional justice processes—sometimes involving truth and reconciliation mechanisms—can play a significant role in helping violence-affected communities heal. Recent research has also highlighted the benefits of incorporating restorative justice in such processes, including bringing victims and perpetrators together in dialogue to address the effects of past abuses.18
There were several key developments in 2024 in international justice efforts for conflict violations against civilians. The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants on 21 November against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant for crimes against humanity including murder and persecution, as well as the war crime of using starvation as a method of warfare, the first time the latter was explicitly evoked by the Court (see Protect section).19 The ICC simultaneously issued a warrant for Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif, although this was revoked when his death was confirmed in early 2025.20 In a separate case on 26 June, the ICC convicted the Malian Islamist militant al-Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz for war crimes and crimes against humanity including torture and persecution, and later sentenced him to 10 years in prison.21 Justice activists, however, raised concerns that al-Hassan was acquitted of the crime of gender persecution - the Court’s first ever ruling on this crime - and what this could mean for future justice efforts and jurisprudence on gender-based atrocities.22
The International Court of Justice (ICJ)—which examines disputes between states, while the ICC focuses on individual criminal responsibility—issued six provisional measures in January in the case brought by South Africa against Israel for violating the Genocide Convention.23 These amount to a de facto legal injunction to end genocidal practices in the context of Israel’s conflict against Hamas in Gaza. Human rights groups and the UN, however, accused Israel of essentially ignoring the Court’s order.24 The ICJ also held public hearings in December on the advisory opinion it is developing on states’ obligations to tackle climate change, which could have significant impacts for civilians increasingly affected by climate-induced conflicts (See Prevent).25
The long-anticipated international treaty on crimes against humanity also moved closer to becoming a reality last year, as the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 79/122 in December calling for negotiations for such a treaty to begin.26 The resolution stipulates that a new convention on crimes against humanity should be presented to states for ratification by 2029, with formal negotiations to begin in 2026. Human rights groups have long campaigned for such a treaty to address current gaps in international law, particularly to better enumerate states’ obligations to hold perpetrators accountable for large-scale atrocities.27 In light of the severe repression of women and girls in Afghanistan and elsewhere, human rights actors have also called for the new treaty to codify gender apartheid as a crime against humanity.28
Legal activists have increasingly embraced universal jurisdiction (UJ) cases to pursue justice for conflict violations in recent years, and this trend continued in 2024. UJ is based on the principle that some crimes are so horrific that they concern humanity as a whole and can be prosecuted anywhere, regardless of where they took place or the nationality of the perpetrators. There was a 33 percent rise globally in such cases between 2022 and 2024, partly due to a perception that national courts offer a more direct avenue to justice than the often slower international proceedings.29 In one notable case, a Swiss court sentenced Ousman Sonko, former Gambian Minister of Interior, to 20 years in prison for multiple crimes against humanity in May 2024.30 This followed several successful UJ prosecutions in European courts in recent years, including related to Syria, Iran, and Liberia. Such cases have, however, also increasingly been accepted in other regions, notably the US and Argentina (see Spotlight article on Rohingya below).
While both victims and legal activists have welcomed the growing importance of UJ, some critics have pointed out that political concerns often play an outsized role in where such cases are accepted.31 European countries, for example, have faced criticism for double standards in enthusiastically embracing UJ cases against Russian officials for alleged atrocities in Ukraine, but ignoring Israel’s actions in Gaza. As of the end of 2024, more than 20 states had announced cases against Russian officials, compared to not a single one against an Israeli official. In France and Norway, courts have rejected attempts to open such cases.32
Universal Jurisdiction and the Long Road Toward Justice for the Rohingya
This article was authored by Tun Khin, the President of the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK), and Tomás Ojea Quintana, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar and BROUK’s legal representative. This article focuses on legal processes and survivors’ access to justice. It does not ascribe collective blame to the people of Myanmar and distinguishes between state institutions, specific officials, and non-state actors.
In 2017, the Myanmar military launched operations that, according to UN reports and rights groups, involved widespread and systematic abuses against the Rohingya, a mainly Muslim minority group living in the country’s northwestern Rakhine State. In the space of a few months, thousands of Rohingya women, men, and children were killed, whole villages were torched to the ground, and almost 800,000 people were forced to flee into Bangladesh, where they mostly continue to live as refugees.33 For the Rohingya, the years since these atrocities—which UN-mandated mechanisms and multiple rights organizations have characterized as constituting genocide–have been defined by a quest for justice to ensure accountability for these crimes, and also to prevent their reoccurrence.34
One such avenue for accountability has emerged in Argentina, more than 11,000 miles from Rakhine State. In 2019, the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK), a London-based NGO, filed a universal jurisdiction (UJ) case in Buenos Aires, alleging that specific current and former officials committed genocide and crimes against humanity.35 UJ is enshrined in the Argentine constitution, and the country has a long and progressive history of accepting such cases, including related to Francisco Franco-era crimes in Spain or more recent violations in Gaza.36
Despite some initial hesitation from the Argentinian judiciary, the case was formally accepted in 2021. Since then, the investigation has made rapid progress. One particular highlight was when, in December 2023, six refugee women traveled from camps in Bangladesh to testify in Buenos Aires. “They provided detailed testimony regarding sexual violence in Chut Pyin village in 2017. This marked the first time Rohingya survivors testified in a court of law on these events.37 In February 2022, BROUK also petitioned the Argentinian judiciary to request information from Facebook to clarify its role in inciting anti-Rohingya violence,38 as the UN has labelled it the “leading platform for hate speech in Myanmar.”39 Despite official follow-up communication from the Argentinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US State Department, Facebook has yet to respond to the request.
In June 2024, the case experienced a major breakthrough: the Argentine prosecutor, acting on a request from BROUK, petitioned the judiciary to issue arrest warrants against several Myanmar officials. These included Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of the current military government in Myanmar, and his deputy, Soe Win, other senior army and civilian officials, as well as lower-level soldiers who were allegedly directly involved in crimes. On February 14, 2025, the Federal Court in Buenos Aires formally approved the request and issued arrest warrants for 22 military officials and three civilians in connection with alleged crimes against humanity and genocide against the Rohingya, including former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and former President Htin Kyaw.40 Eventually, the Court’s decision may, subject to INTERPOL procedures and Member State discretion, result in requests for notices in all its 196 member states to detain Min Aung Hlaing and the other indicted officials for extradition to stand trial in Argentina.41
This progress in Argentina shows the potential of universal jurisdiction to advance the cause of justice for civilian conflict victims, regardless of where violations take place. This is particularly true at a time when many global justice bodies are facing unprecedented political pressure and resource strains. At the same time, BROUK’s case both mirrors and complements other international justice efforts on the Rohingya. Such complementarity is crucial when pursuing justice for complex, international atrocity crimes. In fact, BROUK’s case has triggered direct engagement between the Argentinian judiciary and the International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), the UN body documenting violations in Myanmar to be used in criminal proceedings.
The ICC authorized its own investigation into crimes against the Rohingya by Myanmar’s military in 2019.42 However, the investigation is limited to crimes that were committed, at least partially, in Bangladesh, since Bangladesh is a signatory to the ICC’s founding charter—the Rome Statute, while Myanmar is. The offenses that the ICC can investigate include, for example, the crimes against humanity of mass deportation—since hundreds of thousands of Rohingya were forced to flee into Bangladesh—and persecution. On November 14, 2019, just a day after BROUK first filed its own case in Buenos Aires, the ICC’s judges officially confirmed that a case could be opened. The Court has made important strides forward since, and on November 28, 2024, the current Prosecutor Karim Khan asked the ICC to issue an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing for committing crimes against humanity against the Rohingya, indicating more requests would follow.43 While the ICC has yet to officially grant the warrants, it is extremely rare for its judges to reject such requests.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also become an important avenue for accountability. In November 2019, the Gambia, acting on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, brought a case against Myanmar to the ICJ for violating the international genocide convention in its treatment of the Rohingya. A few months later, the Court imposed provisional measures on Myanmar in the case, ordering an end to genocidal practices against the Rohingya.44 While Myanmar’s current authorities have not demonstrated compliance with the provisional measures according to monitoring by human rights groups, these measures continue to carry both moral and political weight.45 In 2022, the Court rejected an appeal by Myanmar against the case, allowing proceedings to continue, although a verdict is likely to be several years away.46
Collectively, these developments have contributed to a sense that—slowly but surely—accountability for the architects of the Rohingya genocide could be within reach. Time is of the essence, however, as the situation for the approximately 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State is increasingly dire. They continue to be denied citizenship and face crippling discrimination in all aspects of their lives, actions that rights groups have said amount to apartheid.47 At the same time, Rohingya have been targeted by both government military forces and the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed group, in the ongoing conflict, while starvation is a growing concern.48
International support for these justice efforts is crucial. Beyond Argentina, other states should explore the possibility of opening parallel UJ cases on the Rohingya situation. Governments should also consider offering formal support to the Gambia’s genocide case against Myanmar at the ICJ, as Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have already done.49 At the same time, it is vital that donor support to civil society actors continues, and that UN efforts to document both past and present violations against the Rohingya are sustained, including through the IIMM.
Footnotes
- UNGA, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Resolution 60/147, December 16, 2005.
- Amnesty International, Kandahar Massacre: International Forces Must Increase Protection of Afghan Civilians, March 12, 2012.
- Médecins Sans Frontières, “Kunduz hospital attack in depth,” 2015, accessed September 3, 2025, https://www.msf.org/kunduz-hospital-attack
- United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and UN OHCHR, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – Midyear Report 2017, July 2017, p 58.
- UNAMA and OHCHR, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – Annual Report 2019, February 2020, p 17.
- CIVIC, Unacknowledged Harm: Hurdles to Receiving Victims’ Assistance in Afghanistan, December 2020.
- UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – Annual Report 2019, pp. 73–74.
- This article draws on six qualitative interviews conducted with Afghan civilians and community actors in Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar, and Bamyan in August 2025.
- Interview #1, Former teacher, Bamyan, August 2025.
- Interview #2, Community organizer, Balkh, August 2025.
- Interview #3, Former Teacher, Kabul, August 2025.
- Interview #4, Civil society activist, Herat, August 2025.
- Human Rights Watch, World Report 2024: Afghanistan, 2024.
- “Global: Gender apartheid must be recognized as a crime under international law,” Amnesty International, June 17, 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/06/global-gender-apartheid-must-be-recognized-as-a-crime-under-international-law/
- Interview #5, Nangarhar, August 2025.
- Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), “NRC in Iran,” last updated May 7, 2025, https://www.nrc.no/countries/asia/iran
- Interview #6, Helmand, August 2025.
- International Center for Transitional Justice, Transforming Social Relations: Restorative Responses to Massive Human Rights Violations, April 2024.
- "ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I rejects the State of Israel’s challenges to jurisdiction and issues warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant," ICC, November 21, 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges
- "Hamas confirms the killing of military commander Mohammed Deif," Al Jazeera, January 30, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/30/hamas-confirms-the-killing-of-military-commander-mohammed-deif
- ICC, "Al Hassan Case," accessed September 1, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-hassan
- Alexandra Lily Kather and Juliana Santos de Carvalho, "On the Significance and Potential of a Non-Definition: The 'Gender' Debate in the Draft Crimes Against Humanity Treaty," Just Security October 2, 2024, https://www.justsecurity.org/103377/defining-gender-crimes-against-humanity/
- "Gaza: Israel must implement Provisional Measures ordered by the International Court of Justice," International Commission of Jurists, January 26, 2024, https://www.icj.org/gaza-israel-must-implement-provisional-measures-ordered-by-the-international-court-of-justice/
- "Israel Not Complying with World Court Order in Genocide Case," Human Rights Watch, February 26, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/26/israel-not-complying-world-court-order-genocide-case "Gaza: UN committee alarmed by Israel’s blatant disregard for binding international orders," UN OHCHR, December 13, 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/12/gaza-un-committee-alarmed-israels-blatant-disregard-binding-international
- Jorge Alejandro Carrillo Bañuelos and Maria Antonia Tigre, "The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Climate Change: Key Takeaways from the 2024 Hearings", Columbia Law School, March 10, 2025, https://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2025/03/10/the-icjs-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change-key-takeaways-from-the-2024-hearings-part-1/
- UNGA, Resolution 79/122. UN Doc. A/RES/79/122.
- Richard Dicker, "Moving Ahead to a Crimes Against Humanity Treaty", Opinio Juris, December 19, 2024.
- "Gender apartheid must be recognized as a crime under international law," Amnesty International, June 17, 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/06/gender-apartheid-must-be-recognized-international-law/
- TRIAL International, Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2024, April 2024.
- Wedaeli Chibuleshi, "Swiss court jails Gambia ex-minister for 20 years," BBC, May 15, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjljl54n0z1o
- TRIAL International, Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2025, April 2025.
- "La justice française classe une plainte dénonçant des tortures imputées à un soldat franco-israélien," L'Orient-Le Jour, September 10, 2024, https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1426626/conflit-a-gaza-la-justice-francaise-classe-une-plainte-denoncant-des-tortures-imputees-a-un-soldat-franco-israelien.html "Appeals dismissal to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Expanding the complaint to the act of genocide," Forsvar folkeretten, June 26, 2024. https://forsvarfolkeretten.no/2024/06/26/appeals-dismissal-to-the-director-of-public-prosecution-expanding-the-complaint-to-the-act-of-genocide/
- UN OHCHR, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, UN Doc. A/HRC/42/50.
- "UN expert demands accountability for the Rohingya and an end to ‘paralysis of indifference,’" UN OHCHR, August 24, 2023, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/un-expert-demands-accountability-rohingya-and-end-paralysis-indifference; US Department of State, "Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya in Burma," accessed September 1, 2025, https://2021-2025.state.gov/burma-genocide/
- "Argentinean courts urged to prosecute senior Myanmar military and government officials for the Rohingya genocide," BROUK, November 13, 2019, https://brouk.org.uk/argentinean-courts-urged-to-prosecute-senior-myanmar-military-and-government-officials-for-the-rohingya-genocide/
- TRIAL International, "Universal Jurisdiction: Law and Practice in Argentina", accessed September 1, 2025, https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/universal-jurisdiction-law-and-practice-in-argentina/
- "Argentinian judiciary asks Facebook to clarify role in Rohingya genocide," BROUK, March 7, 2022, https://brouk.org.uk/argentinian-judiciary-asks-facebook-to-clarify-role-in-rohingya-genocide/.
- Ibid.
- UN OHCHR, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, UN Doc. A/HRC/42/50.
- "Argentina court issues international arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing – A historic step towards justice for Rohingya genocide," BROUK, February 14, 2025, https://brouk.org.uk/argentina-court-issues-international-arrest-warrant-for-min-aung-hlaing-a-historic-step-towards-justice-for-rohingya-genocide-2/
- In 2025, Brouk has further amended the case to push for the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar military), and individual senior commanders, to provide financial compensation to Rohingya victims.
- "ICC judges authorise opening of an investigation into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar,” ICC, November 14, 2019, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-judges-authorise-opening-investigation-situation-bangladesh/myanmar
- "Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Application for an arrest warrant in the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar," ICC, November 27, 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-application-arrest-warrant-situation-bangladesh
- "Myanmar: implement “provisional measures” order of the International Court of Justice without delay," International Commission of Jurists, January 2020, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Myanmar-International-Court-of-Justice-Press-Release-2020-ENG.pdf
- "Five Years On – World Court Orders to Protect the Rohingya Still Being Ignored," BROUK, January 22, 2025, https://brouk.org.uk/five-years-on-world-court-orders-to-protect-the-rohingya-still-being-ignored/
- "Reaction to the ruling by the International Court of Justice to reject Myanmar’s preliminary objections - Statement by Nicholas Koumjian, Head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar," IIMM, July 22, 2022, https://iimm.un.org/en/reaction-ruling-international-court-justice-reject-myanmars-preliminary-objections-statement
- Amnesty International UK, "Myanmar’s apartheid campaign against the Rohingya," accessed September 1, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/myanmar-apartheid-campaign-against-rohingya-burma
- Because of these developments, in August 2025, BROUK asked the Argentinian judiciary to expand its investigation to also include violations against the Rohingya by the AA. See also, "Myanmar: Arakan Army Oppresses Rohingya Muslims," Human Rights Watch, July 28, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/28/myanmar-arakan-army-oppresses-rohingya-muslims
- The governments of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, Joint declaration of intervention in the case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice, November 16, 2023.